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Abstract: 
Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. These are often
internationally funded. But how do such programs account for previously existing security
institutions and the security needs of  local communities? This article examines SSR all over
Africa to assess local ownership and path dependency from a New Institutionalist
perspective. It finds that SSR, particularly in post-conflict countries, tends to be driven by
ideas and perceptions of  international donors promoting generalized blueprints. Often, such
programs only account in a very limited way for path-dependent aspects of  security
institutions or the local context. Hence the reforms often lack local participation and are
thus not accepted by the local community eventually. 
Keywords: Security Sector Reform, African security, international engagement, local
ownership, New Institutionalism 
Acknowledgements
The author thanks Toni Haastrup and Hylke Dijkstra for the opportunity to contribute to
the forum on African security and their valuable comments on the article’s previous version.
She also thanks Daniel J. Dunleavy for his excellent research assistance and Julia Strasheim
and Sabine Kurtenbach for their comments on a previous version of  the article.  This article
results out of  a research project on “Security Sector Reform and the Stability of  Post-War
Peace” that is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) and based at the GIGA
German Institute of  Global and Area Studies in Hamburg.
Disclosure statement: 
This research is funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). 
No conflict of  interest was reported by the author.
Many African states have security sector reform (SSR) programs. SSR is commonly defined
as changes in the structure and conduct of  those state institutions responsible for the
prosecution and punishment of  non-legal manifestations of  violence:  the military, police,
and judiciary. This raises the question how do internationally funded or nationally led
programs account for previously existing security institutions and the security needs of  local
communities? And what are the implications for the effectiveness of  these efforts? The
security sector represents the most visible arm of  governments. In a Western centric
perception, these three institutions work together to sustain the state monopoly on the
legitimate use of  force in order to establish and maintain security in a country and protect its
people from any kind of  violence (Weber, 1980 [1922]). According to international donors,
many countries in the world, however, suffer from an imbalance of  these security
institutions–and African countries are no exception. 
One common strategy by governments and international donors to tackle ongoing armed
conflict and political instability in African countries is security sector reform (SSR). This
often includes the following measures (Brzoska, 2003; Brzoska & Heinemann-Grüder, 2004;
Hänggi, 2004): 
(a) military reform, such as the restructuring, reduction, merging, or creation of  armed
forces, the education and training of  recruits and the separation of  the tasks of  police and
the military; 
(b) police reform, such as the restructuring, creation, education and training of  police
forces and the recruitment of  officers;
( c ) judicial reform, such as the creation of  an independent judiciary through legal
separation and changes to judicial appointments, and the development of  basic foundations
of  rule of  law and training of  judicial personnel.1 
In post-conflict countries, programs towards the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration of  combatants (DDR) are seen as necessity to re-establish the monopoly on
the use of  force. DDR is, however, often not considered as part of  SSR. It is considered a
necessary prior step creating appropriate conditions for SSR activities (Bendix & Stanley,
2008, p. 17). Hence, only a few international actors, such as the United Nations (UN) or the
World Bank, engage in DDR activities.
To understand processes of  SSR, it is useful to consider insights from New Institutionalism
and its variant historical institutionalism. According to Fioretus, Falleti, and Sheingate (2016,
p. 9; see also Ansorg & Kurtenbach 2016), historical institutionalism adopts two ontological
claims: (1) causally relevant conditions can combine in varied ways to produce a given
outcome, and (2) that the same inputs and causal mechanisms, in different contexts, can yield
different outcomes. In other words, once a decision for a particular institutional path is
made, it is hard to go back and go another way (Pierson, 2004). Furthermore, different
institutional choices have different implications according to the domestic, cultural, and
political context. 
When analyzing SSR efforts, it is useful to apply an institutionalist lens. First, the reform of
the security sector does not happen from scratch. It is path dependent upon previous
1 Due to limited data availability, I will not include penal reform or reform of  the intelligence services and thus 
follow a rather narrow understanding of  SSR. 
choices of  how police, military, and judiciary were designed in a country and what role they
played in the previous political regime or throughout violent conflict. According to Pierson
(2004, p. 20), path dependency is defined as “dynamic processes involving positive
feedback,” or self-reinforcement. Large set-up costs or increasing returns, for example,
generate positive feedback effects that make the departure or deviation from an existing path
increasingly more difficult over time. Particularly the establishment of  a security sector and
civilian trust (or distrust) towards it involves significant commitment and once it is
established it is very difficult to change it easily. Hence, Pierson’s more general claim that any
revisions will be “powerfully constrained and channeled by previous institutional choices”
(p. 152) is also valid for the security sector. 
Second, and related, the local environment also affects the effectiveness of  a reform of  the
security sector. As the literature on local ownership in peacebuilding and SSR repeatedly
pointed out, international reform efforts cannot ignore the local needs of  security provision
(Hirblinger & Simons, 2015; Hönke & Müller, 2012; Zanker, 2016). Rather, the needs of  the
local community should be included in the reform programs so that the local community
eventually accepts the reform. 
Institutionalists have therefore repeatedly stressed the endurance of  institutions, and their
invariance despite the turnover of  individuals; in other words, institutions tend to be resilient
to change (March & Olsen, 1989, 2008; Pierson, 2004). However, there may be particular
moments, or windows of  opportunity (Pierson, 2004, p. 152), which make institutional
development more likely. First, institutional reform of  the security sector is particularly likely
during or after conflict. When a previous political system is turned over by violent conflict,
there is often a critical juncture that can contribute to a reform of  security sector
institutions. Former warring parties, but also international peacebuilders like the UN or
bilateral donors, may support a change of  the security institutions and an adjustment to the
needs of  a post-conflict environment, such as increased need of  civilian protection as well as
DDR programs for former rebels. 
Second, security institutions can also change incrementally in peaceful times. As Mahoney
and Thelen (2010) have shown, even in the absence of  exogenous shocks, gradual
institutional change is possible, though in subtle way and observable over a span of  a couple
of  years and decades. The need for institutional change then often reflects contradicting
opinions by opponents and challenges by social and political actors on the ground (Capoccia,
2016) and the possibility to slowly displace, layer, drift, or converse existing rules (Mahoney
& Thelen, 2010, p. 15ff.). In this article, I take a look at security sector reform in different
circumstances–after conflict and during peaceful times–and assess if  SSR programs take into
account path dependent practices and local contexts. 
To assess the reform of  the security sector, I explore 47 different countries in North and
sub-Saharan Africa,2 dividing them into two groups. First, those that experienced large scale
violence with over 1,000 cumulative battle-related deaths over the period of  an armed
conflict (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Pettersson &
Wallensteen, 2015). This includes 20 conflict and post-conflict countries such as
Mozambique or South Sudan. Second are those countries that have not experienced large-
scale violence (although they may suffer from smaller incidences of  armed violence or coup
2
 Excluding those African countries that have a population of  less than 1 Mio. people. 
attempts), and can be seen as either transitional or stable countries. In these 27 countries,
particularly Cameroon and Tanzania, the challenges do not lie in post-conflict reconstruction
itself, but more in a transformative reform of  the security sector. 
I assess if  there was, in the period of  1990-2015, any kind of  substantive reform of  the
security sector.3 If  there are only superficial efforts towards reform, I do not count it as SSR.
To assess reform aspects of  the security sector I looked into single case studies, policy
reports, as well as news sites to find any information on the implementation of  the different
areas of  SSR. I then coded a “1” if  a program was implemented. If  I could not find any
information on a SSR program, I coded a “0”. Additionally, I collected descriptive
information on the inclusion of  previous institutional settings as well as the attendance
towards local context conditions for the reform of  the security sector.
I find that SSR processes all over Africa, but particularly in post-conflict countries tend to be
disproportionally driven by ideas and perceptions of  international donors promoted in
generalized blueprints. Often, these programs only account in a limited way for the local
context of  SSR. Hence, the reforms often lack local participation and are thus not accepted
by the local community eventually. 
One result of  this misfit between donor-driven approaches and local needs is that the
dominant paradigm of  SSR and security governance is fundamentally at odds with the
underlying realities of  African states, where state authority and security can be exercised also
by different local or traditional actors that exist beyond the nation state (Bagayoko, Hutchful,
& Luckham, 2016, p. 2). Most international SSR programs do not account for these local
contexts and thus do not include informal, alternative actors of  security into their programs.
At the same time, there are only a handful of  states where SSR is driven by local actors,
often in cases where there is a strong motivation of  local actors due to military victory as in
Angola or Rwanda or in case of  a strong unifying moment as in South Africa. Further, SSR
in transitional countries is often a matter of  elite control. Again, due to the requirements of
donors, which fund these activities, governments try to comply with the Western notion of
security sector and its reform and do only narrowly account for path dependency or the local
contexts of  the security sector. They turn their back towards alternative and more informal
aspects of  security sector that are already existent in most of  the countries.
The article proceeds as follows: the next section will deal with the particular challenge of
SSR in post-conflict countries, before I turn to SSR in transforming countries. By way of
conclusion, I discuss the possibility of  a turn towards more informal security structures. 
SSR as part of  (post-conflict) peacebuilding 
In African countries affected by large-scale violence, we can see an increased need for
institutional reform of  the security sector. Often, the state itself, together with military and
police, is involved in the armed conflict and thus not able to protect its people anymore. The
population may lack trust in the security institutions, and as a result they seek for their safety
from attacks by either the state or non-state actors. The judiciary is often completely
destroyed or malfunctions. And opposing parties challenge the formerly enduring collection
3
 I thank Daniel J. Dunleavy for his excellent research assistance. The data collection will be made available in 
an online appendix on https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/team/ansorg
of  rules and organized practices. At the end of  the conflict and particularly in peace
negotiations, warring parties will push for a reform of  the security sector and an inclusion in
the different security institutions. Exogenous pressure might come from international
donors, which engage in peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions. In these difficult times,
the two aspects that New Institutionalism has stressed as particularly important for
institutional reform need to be included: the path dependency of  security institutions as well
as the local contexts and needs of  the population (Pierson, 2004, p. 150ff.). 
Most of  the African conflict and post-conflict countries had or have seen some kind of  SSR
activities. As Graph 1 shows, for post-conflict countries, a majority saw the need for some
sort of  reform of  security sector institutions, with only the Republic of  Congo (Congo-
Brazzaville), Chad or Libya having no tangible reform activities. While most SSR programs
or activities comprise comprehensive reforms that cover multiple areas at the same time, it is
possible to distinguish between the different activities of  institutional security sector reform.
As a DDR program is seen as a necessary prior step creating appropriate conditions for SSR
activities (Bendix & Stanley, 2008, p. 17), it is unsurprising that a majority of  the post-
conflict countries saw a DDR program implemented. This includes the demobilization and
reintegration of  the fighters from RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana) in
Mozambique with the help of  the UN. 
A second big area of  reform is military reform. After large-scale armed conflict, the military
often needs to be reduced to a size appropriate to peaceful times. Military reform can also
include the societal make-up of  the military, as occurred in Burundi where the share of  Tutsi
and Hutu in the army was changed in the course of  the military reform program. Police and
judiciary reform are slightly smaller reform areas, as most SSR programs first target short-
term security establishment before they attend to build up police and judiciary. Again
unsurprisingly, most of  the countries saw some kind of  engagement by external actors in the
reform process. This can include large-scale reform programs such as in South Sudan,
Liberia, or the DRC; or smaller activities such as technical support or funding of  activities as
in Uganda or Algeria.
Graph 1 – SSR in conflict and transitional countries (in percentage)
Evidence from the analyzed countries shows that international engagement is strong
particularly in those cases where the conflict cleavages between conflict parties or ethnic
groups are particularly severe and thus the commitment problems with the conflict actors
are particularly high (Fearon, 1995; Walter, 2001). In those cases, external actors often set the
agenda of  the reform program, and they are the ones who push into the direction of  a
Westernized SSR program. Countries affected by an intense involvement of  the international
community include Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, or South Sudan.
However, a high international engagement does not necessarily mean that institutional
reform is more successful and the chances of  peace are more likely. This is due to two
reasons: first, previous research has shown that international actors like the UN tend to
engage in the most severe cases, where third party guarantees are most needed due to the
severity of  the conflict or the deep cleavages between the conflict parties (Ruggeri,
Dorussen, & Gizelis, 2016). This means that chances of  peace are lower from the outset
than in countries where conflict is less severe. 
Second, in those cases of  utmost emergency, international peacekeeping and peacebuilding
missions tend to build peace and implement security sector reform according to fixed
blueprints but often without linking them to the previous institutional settings or specific
local contexts. SSR programs including DDR, police, military, and judiciary reform are then
merely a box-ticking exercise without attention to local needs and wishes. Due to the
emergency of  many post-conflict situations, this might be the quickest and easiest way.
However, institutions tend to be sticky and the endeavor of  reform will fail if  the reformers
do not attend to the path dependent nature of  institutions. Hence, these programs often do
not create security institutions accepted by everyone in society, but they rather lead to a lack
of  trust by the local communities in these security institutions, in particular towards police
and judiciary. 
For instance, even though Burundi saw UN engagement as well as a thorough DDR
program and military and police reform (Edmonds, Mills, & McNamee, 2009), serious
challenges remain in the country and it just recently suffered from a renewed outbreak of
violence. The DDR program that was run by the World Bank prioritized working through
the national government and did not include local actors such as local NGOs, community
members, and ex-combatants themselves (Willems, Kleingeld, & van Leeuwen, 2010, p.
13ff.). The lack of  rooting the program at the sub-national level led to frustration of  local
actors (ibid.). 
Furthermore, while the peacekeeping mission was engaged in a reform of  security
institutions such as the police or military, they failed to account for past make up and
historical dependency of  these security institutions. This led to a mistrust of  the security
institutions by the local population. The police are not following the rule of  law, but often
serve the ruling party for their political ends (Ball, 2014). Further, the international
peacekeeping mission implemented institutional reform of  the security sector, but did not
actually link this to trust-building measurements on the ground. Thus, many Burundians
perceive the police as agents of  repression and do not see them as independent and
objective source of  order. As a consequence, the willingness amongst the population to
resort to vigilantism or “mob justice” increased in the years since the end of  the conflict
(Ball, 2014). 
Another critical case where international perceptions of  SSR are far from local needs is
South Sudan. In South Sudan, an ambitious plan for SSR clashes with the lack of  sufficient
resources for the mammoth task to establish a new state in the shadow of  ongoing violence.
For instance, prior to South Sudan’s independence in 2011, the international peacekeeping
force UNMIS focused only minimally on SSR as the mission was under-resourced and often
distracted by conflict management of  South Sudan’s internal conflicts (Yakovenko, 2014, p.
45). Not enough attention was paid to diverging political interests of  the actors on the
ground–hence, international actors as well as the new national government failed to account
for path dependency and the societal context that make up South Sudan’s security situation
until today. 
Nowadays, insecurity continues to be high due to tensions at the border with Sudan and
inter-factional and inter-ethnic tensions in South Sudan itself  (cf. Snowden 2012: 9ff.). Thus,
any process of  SSR is only slow or will be postponed to a later point in time. For example, in
2013 the World Bank estimated that the SPLA and the southern militias made up about
300,000 soldiers in combined strength (Yakovenko, 2014, p. 52f.). A reduction of  fighters
would be more than necessary, as the size is unsustainable and the previous integration of
militias without vetting led to massive human rights abuses (Yakovenko, 2014, p. 53).
However, the current security situation prevents any thorough reform of  the military. As
Munive states, standard DDR programs and their templates do not fit in a context like South
Sudan, were perceptions of  international donors clash with (in-)security and political realities
of  actors on the ground (Munive, 2013, p. 8). 
Besides the post-conflict countries with major peacekeeping and peacebuilding missions,
there are a couple of  countries where the international engagement was quite low. This
might be due to different reasons: first, local actors feel responsible for their own reform
efforts and are reluctant to let a huge peacekeeping or peacebuilding mission into the
country, as happened in Rwanda or Angola. Second, there might be a local need of
international assistance, but international actors on the other hand are reluctant to engage in
the reform process as it might be seen to cost- or time-intensive and political or economic
will is lacking, as occurred in the Central African Republic. 
In Rwanda, for example the government “owned” the whole process from conceptualization
to implementation and the international community only partially funded the SSR activities
(Edmonds et al., 2009). One reason for this is the lack of  international prevention of  the
genocide in 1994, which is why the Rwandan government did not allow major international
intrusion in security or statebuilding matters. After the complete destruction of  the security
sector during the genocide, the new government managed to reinstall military, police, and
judiciary within only a couple of  years (Edmonds et al., 2009). During this process, Rwanda
has maintained a strong commitment to the idea that reform must be locally owned and
driven, and not be imposed from the outside (Edmonds et al., 2009). The government in
Kigali has been able to set its own agenda based on the assessment of  what needs to be
done to meet the country’s requirements and invites international partners to complement its
efforts where local capacity and resources are lacking. While this can be a model for
countries with a strong willing and able government, it comes with certain drawbacks:
Rwanda is an authoritarian country today, which hardly allows for critical comments on
government policies. 
In most conflict and post-conflict countries, we find what New Institutionalism
conceptualizes as critical juncture: political opponents challenge the old institutional system,
and there is the chance of  establishing a new system. Thus, there is a window of  opportunity
(Pierson, 2004, p. 152) that makes institutional development, also in the security sector, more
likely. Particularly in those cases where conflict cleavages between conflict parties or ethnic
groups are severe, we can find a strong international engagement in the reform of  the
security sector. However, due to the difficulties of  compromise between conflict actors, the
most obvious solution for international donors in these cases seem to be a prescription of
Western SSR approaches as stabilizing tool–often without enough attention to the given
institutional realities on the ground and thus without the necessary inclusion of  path
dependency and local needs in the design of  the reform programs. 
The internationally-driven SSR programs and the related templates do not account for
specific circumstances or societal contexts that are seen as most important by New
Institutionalism (cf. March & Olsen, 1989; Pierson, 2004). Due to very high expectations on
the donor side to create a security sector in the Weberian style, a “failure” in the Western
sense of  SSR is often inevitable. Moreover, this approach is blind on the side of  local,
traditional attempts of  security provisions that might work better for some African contexts.
There are few exceptions were the process is in the hands of  the governing elite, such as in
Rwanda or Angola. This often comes at cost at authoritarian decisions and the creation of  a
security sector that is not driven by rule of  law, but the political will of  the government.
SSR in transitional or stable countries
Institutional reform can also occur in the absence of  exogenous shocks or critical junctures
in a gradual and subtle way and incrementally over a span of  a couple of  years and decades
(Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). This is also the case with SSR in transitional countries. The need
to reform the security sector is not as pending as it is in countries affected by large-scale
violence. However, due to ongoing insecurities, for instance by low scale armed conflict or
military coups, SSR can take place incrementally. In fact, institutional reform of  the security
sector often reflects underlying processes of  imperfect compliance, rule reinterpretation, and
coalition building among social and political actors (Capoccia, 2016). International donors
often fund the reforms, as there are not enough resources available in many countries. 
As Graph 1 shows, despite the lack of  urgency, a majority of  the non-conflict countries in
the sample still implement some reforms of  the security sector. Five countries, Botswana,
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Gambia, and Zimbabwe, did not see any tangible SSR efforts in
the analyzed time period. The number of  DDR measures in transitional countries is naturally
lower than for post-conflict countries, and most of  the transitional countries implement
DDR as part of  a post-coup process to reduce the numbers of  the military as in Burkina
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, or Zambia. Others implement a DDR program as part of  their
attempted transition towards democracy or after minor armed conflict, such as in South
Africa, Mali, Namibia, or Niger. Military reform is prevalent in a majority of  the analyzed
transitional countries, which is unsurprising given the role the military plays in many African
polities. Police and judiciary reform is less pending in transitional countries, and thus both
reform areas are only tackled in about half  of  the analyzed countries. Even though the
urgency of  SSR is not as pending in transitional countries as it is in conflict countries, there
is still quite some international engagement in the SSR activities (41%).
Due to the nature of  the political situation in transitional countries, international donors
engage far less and less extensive than in conflict or post-conflict countries. Usually, they
focus on funding and support for SSR programs, although not without pushing into a
certain direction of  the Western model of  state and security and with similar implications for
success and failure of  the missions. This comes often at the cost of  leaving the local
perception of  security and the established institutional settings. 
The EUSSR Mission in Guinea Bissau from 2008-2010 is a notorious example here (Kohl,
2014, 2015). Designed as comprehensive SSR mission that included three different areas of
security assistance–military reform, police reform, and judicial reform including rule of  law–
it lays bare the problems many developing countries face with the unrealistic expectations of
international donors: There were differing understandings and expectations on EU and
Bissau-Guinean side; the mission lacked coordination, integration, flexibility and continuity
among the different fields of  activity; the financial resources of  the mission were inadequate;
there was insufficient incorporation of  societal actors and representatives from the Bissau-
Guinean security sector in the reform process; and there was poor communication between
the involved parties (Kohl, 2014, p. I). 
Furthermore, as Ansorg and Haastrup (2016, p. 14ff.) point out, while the EU mainly
cooperated with male elites in the country, local-level and particularly female-driven NGOs
were not consulted. The efforts of  the EU mission did not speak to the institutional settings
on the ground and did not account for path dependency and local contexts. The misfit
between expectations of  the EU and local needs and wishes became particularly evident
when the mission was completed and regarded as failure by the local community.  
South Africa on the other hand seems to be an exception in regards to the inclusion of  local
level actors (Africa, 2008; Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006). After the end of  the Apartheid, the
responsible majority party ANC did not have any expertise in the matter of  security sector
reform, and hence they made significant use of  the security knowledge of  domestic policing
researchers, lawyers, peace workers and human rights activists (Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006,
p. 21). Thus, NGOs enjoyed a particularly high visibility in the South African program,
which was due to the transparency and consultative character (Hutchful & Fayemi, 2005, p.
82). The SSR program in South Africa shows a high attention to previous institutional
settings and the problems that evolved out of  the Apartheid rule. To solve these problems,
local actors were included in the design and implementation of  the program. Thus, in this
case reform was implemented with regards to path dependency and context of  institutions.
However, the high levels of  crime that still persist in South Africa until today could not be
tackled by this approach. They are more a matter of  lacking economic opportunities for
large parts of  the society than of  successful security sector reform. 
In South Africa, the inclusion of  the societal and political context played a prominent role,
thus highlighting the importance of  path dependent practices. These factors, however, have
been limited by a combination of  political constraints, limited capacity and interest in most
other African countries (Hutchful & Fayemi, 2005). In other African transitional countries,
security is often a matter of  elite control and the process of  reform is in the hands of  a few
political elites, who only narrowly account for the path dependency and context of
institutional settings. In some cases, institutional change in the security sector tends to serve
the government to strengthen their power rather than to transform the system and include
the local level in the security sector. Parliaments also have been relatively marginal actors in
defense management and oversight, despite constitutional provisions (Hutchful & Fayemi,
2005).
In Guinea, for example, security sector governance is traditionally an unfamiliar topic
(Bangoura, 2015). Guinea is a country that has long been governed by successive dictatorial
regimes that were strongly linked to the military–from Sékou Touré to Lansana Conté to
Moussa Dadis Camara, who was removed from power by the military in 2009. Some first
cautious steps of  military, police, and judicial reform were initiated under President Alpha
Condé, but without particular attention to the specific role of  the military in the Guinean
politics. Path dependency and the local context did not play a role, and the reform efforts
were only half-hearted. Thus the reform died again slowly in the years after. 
Ghana, on the other hand, has always been very open to the reform and democratization of
its security sector. It is seen as island of  peace and stability in Western Africa, and several
donors, including the British DFID, the German GIZ, Denmark, the US, as well as the
World Bank’s International Bank for Reconstruction and Development were engaged in
supporting Ghana in the endeavor of  SSR (Bendix & Stanley, 2008, p. 50). However, some
of  the reform efforts have not been particularly successful as they did not account for the
role of  path dependency in institutional reform: Ghana’s police service is a direct descendant
of  the British colonial police force, and it continues to exhibit many of  the same traits (The
Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2007, p. 7). The experience many people in Ghana
make with the state police is often shaped by corruption, illegal arrest and detention,
excessive use of  force or a failure to respond to complaints (The Commonwealth Human
Rights Initiative, 2007, p. 27). At the same time, traditional policing by ethnic communities
such as the Akan or Ewe that would be more accepted on a local level has never been
included in the colonial or post-colonial reform efforts (The Commonwealth Human Rights
Initiative, 2007, p. 10). And, internationally supported police reform looks more towards
“modernizing” the police force and making it more “effective and disciplined” (BICC/GTZ,
2006, p. 5) than to integrate traditional, communal forms of  policing.  
As transitional countries lack exogenous shocks or windows of  opportunity, reform of  the
security sector is often very slow and gradual, as has been theorized, inter alia, by Mahoney
and Thelen (2010). In those cases where the international community was engaged in the
SSR programs, we can see a promotion of  Western priorities at the expense of  the historical
or societal contexts of  the incumbent country. In other cases reform efforts were very slow
and died out eventually. A positive example is South Africa, which paid attention to
particular historical legacies of  Apartheid and faced the challenges by including local actors
in the process.
Conclusion: A way forward towards more informal security structures?
Current international approaches to SSR have largely failed to account for existing structures
as fundamental to institutional reform. Institutional reform cannot be seen as independent
from previous institutional choices that constitutes the local context. This has implications
for the reform of  the security sector. In other words, the reform of  the security sector does
not occur in a historical vacuum, but is dependent upon previous choices of  how police,
military, and judiciary are designed in a country. Moreover, the local context of  the security
sector also highly affects the effectiveness of  a reform. 
However, when analyzing SSR programs across Africa, it becomes evident that international
donors, in particular, do not take history and the local context into account. Rather, they
continue to follow the Weberian paradigm and adopt a generalized template of  SSR that
does not fit well with the historical and local conditions in many African countries. The
programs are then accompanied by large claims and unrealistic expectations on the side of
the funding international actors (Chappuis & Bryden, 2015, p. 152). The agenda of  these
SSR programs is often set by international funding agencies from the Global North, which
do not account for local needs or specific context conditions. This in turn creates a
dependency on the West for funding resources, which counters the attempt of  local
ownership of  reform (Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006, p. 17) . At the same time, Western
approaches of  SSR are blind on the side of  local, traditional attempts of  security provisions
that might work better for some African contexts.
The dominant paradigm of  SSR and its related templates of  reform are at odds with many
underlying realities of  the African state, where authority and security can be exercised by
different state and non-state actors (Bagayoko et al., 2016, p. 2). These alternative security
actors may be active within or outside the formal arenas of  the state. Often, they are more
accepted by local communities and individuals far away from the capitals as they have a
closer link to these communities. But because they fall outside of  the types of  interlocutors
that international donors and Western actors engage, they are disregarded in many
internationally funded attempts of  SSR. 
Instead of  only promoting one model of  security governance that does not relate to African
realities, international donors and agencies promoting SSR should try and capture the
different, informal security institutions and integrate informal security actors in the reform
processes as well. There is a wide variety of  informal institutions that exist alongside or
within formal political institutions and that are at play in decision-making processes and
public policies (Bagayoko, 2012, p. 3; Hall & Taylor, 1996).
Approaches such as community policing in Sierra Leone could be exemplary here. After the
end of  the civil war, it was promoted as one way of  regaining trust on a very local level:
Among the institutions created to involve the public was a civil society forum that gave
communities a voice in local policing, a role in crime prevention, and a means of  monitoring
the police (Groenewald & Peake, 2004, p. 7). In South Africa, community policing was also a
useful tool to transform a former apartheid institution into an acceptable and legitimate tool
of  social control (Rauch & Van der Spuy, 2006, p. 21). Such kinds of  activities create a
higher ownership at a local level and increase trust of  the local population in security
institutions. They further account for the historical legacies of  policing in these countries.
The challenge therefore is not to terminate existing local and informal social contracts for
the sake of  Western models of  security, but instead to make local governance more
responsive and effective in a manner that accommodates the legitimacy of  local authorities
(Leonard, 2013, p. 7). 
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